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ABSTRACT: In this paper we propose a new approach to sustainable public pension funding, as
an alternative to: (i) traditional actuarial full-funding policies, on the one hand; and (ii) recent
proposals aimed instead at stabilizing pension debt at current levels. Actuarial contribution
policies aim to fund liabilities that are wrongly discounted at the expected rate of return on risky
assets; and these policies promise to do so with amortization schedules that terminate in a
precipitous future drop in contributions, which never materializes. Conversely, recent debtstabilization proposals (Lenney, Lutz, and Sheiner, 2019a; 2019b) properly discount liabilities at
a risk-free rate, but effectively untether contribution policy from those liabilities. Our analysis
integrates properly discounted liabilities with investment strategies that may be risk-tolerant to
some degree, in a policy framework that more transparently conveys the tradeoffs we face.
We begin with the fundamental equations of motion for assets and liabilities – how these two
sides of the ledger evolve with contributions, asset returns, and newly accrued liabilities. From
these equations we formally derive the characteristics of steady-state pension funding – which
we take as the definition of sustainability. We also derive the set of contribution adjustment
parameters that smoothly achieve steady-state – a non-trivial exercise. The resulting
contribution schedules differ conceptually from the traditional setup of normal cost plus
amortization. Building on previous work (Costrell, 2018, Costrell and McGee, 2020), we
examine the steady-state implications of differentiating between the assumed return on assets (r)
and the discount rate on liabilities (d). We integrate these insights into a semi-formal social
optimization framework to sketch out a contribution policy approach that conveys the tradeoffs
between intergenerational burden-sharing, the pursuit of returns, and the cost of risk-bearing.
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Robert M. Costrell and Josh McGee
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Introduction and Summary
Sustainability is the central concern of public pension funding. But the precise meaning
of the term, let alone the conditions for its satisfaction, vary with the user and is often not
precisely defined or analyzed at all. In this paper, we propose a formal economic definition of
sustainability as a funding policy that generates a steady state in the contribution rate and funded
ratio. We begin with the standard equations of motion for assets and liabilities, contingent on the
parameters of the system and the funding policy, which govern the trajectory of contributions.
From these parameters (rate of return on assets, discount rate for liabilities, payroll growth rate,
normal cost rate, benefit payout rate) and the policy specification, we derive the steady state
contribution rate. This allows us to analyze the determinants of contributions in a formal model
and compare that rate with actual contributions currently observed in public pension plans.
Although this exercise oversimplifies actual systems, since the parameters themselves
never settle into steady states, the approach offers insights akin to other simple economic models.
Steady state analysis lays out the system’s resting point, even if it is a moving one. That said,
there are two further important issues to explore. The first is the issue of convergence. Steady
states are of less interest if the system does not converge. We find that the conditions for
convergence/non-convergence in such systems are surprisingly non-trivial, even in this simple
class of models. We analyze this issue formally, determining the range of adjustment parameters
that yields convergence. This generates a novel contribution policy outside of steady state,
differing markedly from the standard actuarial policy of normal cost plus amortization.
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The second issue is how to determine the target funded ratio in the presence of risk.
Specifically, our key steady-state result shows how -- depending on the target funded ratio -- the
contribution rate depends on the gap between the assumed rate of return on risky assets and the
low-risk discount rate on guaranteed benefits for properly valuing liabilities. Specifically, the
steady-state contribution rate can fall well below the normal cost rate, due to implicitly assumed
arbitrage profits represented by that gap. This leads us to sketch out a contribution policy
approach that conveys the tradeoffs between intergenerational burden-sharing, the pursuit of
returns and risk tolerance.

Operationally Defining Sustainability
Although pension plan sustainability is a central concept in policy discussions, the usage
of the term varies and it is not always well-defined. In general terms, the underlying question is
whether the current plan can continue more or less as is, or whether it will require substantial
change (such as a rise in contributions) to stave off insolvency or some other form of collapse.
We believe the formalization of this concept is to be found in steady-state analysis. What would
a steady-state look like under current plan parameters, provisions, and policies, and how does the
contribution rate in such a steady state compare with current rates? If the steady-state
contribution rate is significantly higher than the current rate, then one might well conclude the
system is not sustainable with current contributions. This framework still leaves several issues to
be specified as we continue with this analysis, but it seems a good starting point at least. Steadystate analysis is based on the fundamental laws of motion of a pension plan, those of assets and
liabilities. Let us begin with assets.
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Steady State Condition for Contributions and Asset Accumulation
We can consider asset accumulation as either a stand-alone basis for ascertaining
sustainable funding policies, or as the first step toward considering policies that set asset targets
tied to liabilities. In this section we consider asset accumulation on a stand-alone basis, which
generates insights of its own, and then bring in liabilities in the next section.
There are two sources of pension funding and two uses: contributions and investment
income go to cover the payment of benefits and the accumulation of assets. Of these four flow
variables, the stream of benefit payments is exogenous to our analysis (determined by the tiered
benefit formulas and workforce assumptions), and investment income is governed by the
sequentially determined stock of assets and the exogenous series of annual returns.1 This leaves
the series of contributions and that of asset accumulation, which are mechanically linked. That is,
the funding policy is simultaneously a contribution policy and an asset accumulation policy.
Formally, this relationship is captured in the fundamental asset growth equation:
(1) At+1 = At(1+rt) + ctWt − cptWt ,
where At denotes assets at the beginning of period t, rt is the return in period t, Wt is payroll,
while ct and cpt are the contribution and benefit payment rates, respectively, as proportions of
payroll (Table 1 lists notation). Assets grow by investment earnings, plus contributions, net of
benefit payments. Equation (1) is simply an accounting identity. To give it economic content,
for sustainability analysis, we need to specify a funding policy to drive ct. Given returns and
benefit payments, the contribution policy sets asset growth. We will spell out our approach to
the choice of contribution policy below, but even before doing so, equation (1) helps focus on the
fundamental tradeoffs among these policies without getting overly distracted by their details.

1

Of course, the exogeneity assumed here is conditional on the investment policy, i.e., the asset allocation.
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It will be useful to re-express equation (1) in terms of the ratio of assets to payroll, a ≡
(A/W). Dividing through (1) by Wt, and denoting the growth rate of payroll by g, we have:
(1′) at+1(1+gt) = at(1+rt) + ct − cpt .
The big picture here can be illuminated by examining the steady-state relationship between
contributions and assets. In steady-state, the growth of assets must equal the growth of payroll,
so the asset ratio is constant, at+1 = at = a*. Removing the time subscript for the steady-state
values of the benefit payment rate cp, the rate of return r, and the payroll growth rate g, we have
the relationship between the steady-state values of the contribution rate and the asset ratio:
(1*) c* = cp − (r − g)a*.
The interpretation is straight-forward: benefit payments are covered by a mix of contributions
and investment income (net of growth), where the mix is determined by the funding policy.
Under a policy of pay-go, where no assets are accumulated (a* = 0), the contribution rate must
cover the benefits payment rate cp. Under a policy of pre-funding, to one degree or another, the
goal is to accumulate a certain asset level, a*, so the income from those assets (net of growth)
can help fund benefits, ultimately reducing reliance on contributions.
One very simple test of sustainability is to consider whether current contribution rates are
sufficient to sustain a steady state at current asset levels. That is, if we set a* = a0, would the
current contribution rate, c0, need to rise or not to sustain the asset level?
Let us consider the trends and magnitudes of the relevant variables. Figure 1 depicts the
aggregate values of ct and cpt for FY01 – FY20, of the 119 state and 91 local plans in the Boston
College Public Plans Data, which account for 95 percent of state and local pension assets and
members in the U.S. As is well-known, the contribution rate, as a percent of payroll, has been
steadily climbing since the turn of the century, from about 12 percent to 27 percent. The benefit

4

(or “pay-go”) rate has also trended up, from 20 percent, but may now be leveling off at about 38
percent.2 It is important to note that throughout this period the benefit rate exceeds the
contribution rate by a large margin, exceeding 10 percentage points since 2010. That is, the
basic cash flow (excluding investment income) is negative, due to some combination of plan
maturity and possibly some contribution shortfall (the question we are considering in some
form). Thus, if assets were to be depleted, contributions would have to jump to cover benefits.
Figure 2 depicts the asset ratio a ≡ (A/W) from the same dataset. This has fluctuated with
market returns and has also been affected by the trends in benefit payments, but in recent years
assets have hovered around a multiple of 5 times covered payroll.
For illustrative purposes, we can consider typical plan assumptions of g = 3% and r = 7%
to calculate c* = cp − (r − g)a0 = 0.38 – (0.07 – 0.03) × 5 = 0.18 < c0 = 0.27. Thus, taken at face
value, this would suggest that, in the aggregate, the current configuration is not only sustainable,
but that contribution rates could fall and still support current asset ratios. Of course, this depends
on a host of assumptions, not least of which are the assumed rate of return and growth rate.
However, we can see that as long as (r – g) exceeds about 2 percent (e.g. r > 5 percent), current
contributions could be sustainable in the aggregate.
This picture also holds generally for the individual plans in the PPD database. Using
each plan’s assumed return (the vast majority lie between 7.0 and 7.5 percent for FY20), we find
that in 158 of the 188 plans for which c* can be calculated, the contribution rate exceeds that
value.3 This also holds for 69 of the 79 largest plans, with assets exceeding $10 billion.
Reducing each plans’ assumed return to 5.0 percent changes the picture. Under this calculation,

2

Lenney, Lutz, and Sheiner (2019a; 2019b) project that the benefit rate will peak around [year?] and decline
thereafter, as recent hires, in less generous tiers, enter retirement, and beneficiaries of more generous tiers die.
3
The assumed growth rate for payroll is only available in the PPD for 76 plans. Of those, the vast majority lie
between 2.75 and 3.5 percent, so we set the growth rate at 3.0 percent for the calculation of c* in all plans.
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the contribution rate for most plans (107 of the 188 plans, and 48 of the largest 79 plans) is not
high enough to sustain the current asset ratio.

Contribution Policy for Convergence to Steady State Asset Accumulation: Analytics
Although steady-state calculations (those above, and further specified below) are
instructive, they are not compelling unless there is a dynamic process that converges toward a
steady state. Of course, the steady state is always a moving target, as the parameters cp, r, and g
vary over time, but we can analyze whether the system moves in the right direction at any given
time, taking these parameters as constants, at their steady state values.
Convergence is not automatically assured, as can be discerned by considering the asset
accumulation equation (1′) alone (before adding in a contribution policy equation). To simplify
notation, let R = 1+r, G = 1+g, and re-express (1′) as:
(1″) at+1 = at(R/G) + (ct − cp)/G.
For R > G (as usually assumed), the coefficient on the prior value of the state variable a exceeds
one, which is destabilizing. For example, suppose we consider a policy that sets the contribution
rate to some target rate and holds it constant.4 Unless that target rate corresponds to the steadystate value for maintaining the current asset ratio, the system will diverge. Stated alternatively,
suppose one aims at an asset ratio a* ≠ a0, and immediately sets c = c* (using (1*)), jumping up
or down from c0, and holding it there. Then the system will move away from a*, rather than
toward it. If a* is set greater than a0, then at, will shrink further away from a*, and conversely if
a* is set lower than a0.5 The reason is straightforward. Setting a higher a* means setting a lower
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This is not a fanciful policy scenario. The Lenney, Lutz, and Sheiner (2019a; 2019b) policy simulation is to set c
equal to a steady-state value and hold it there.
5
Formally, the solution is at = a* + (R/G)t(a0 − a*).
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c* for r > g (see equation (1*)), since one expects to rely on higher investment income, in lieu of
contributions, to cover benefits. But since assets are not yet at that higher level of a*, the
investment income falls short of that which would obtain in the steady state one aspires to. Thus,
by prematurely setting contributions at the correspondingly low level c* one embarks on a path
of asset decumulation. And conversely for a* > a0.
So, what would a contribution policy look like that converges to a steady state targeted at
a* with contributions c*? It might be thought that an adjustment process that gradually closes
the gap between current contributions and c*, rather than a sudden jump to c* would do the job,
but as we shall see below, it will not. The reason, as would be suggested by the discussion
above, is that the contribution required to cover benefits depends on the gap between current
assets and a*. Alternatively, one might then suppose that an adjustment process for
contributions based on the asset gap would do the job. However, as we shall see, that will not
suffice either. For a convergent path, we show that the policy should adjust contributions based
on both gaps, between c* and ct and between a* and at, in combinations to be derived below.
Before doing so, note that the policy we are deriving differs not only from a discrete
jump to c*, but also from the trajectory of actuarial funding policies. The actuarial payment
schedule is either a constant percent of payroll, or ramps up to such a rate, and then falls off a
cliff at the end of the amortization period, once full funding is expected to be achieved. The
policy we derive below aims to converge on a steady state, either monotonically or through
dampened oscillations (depending on the adjustment speeds chosen), and then to stay there.
Specifically, consider a contribution and asset-accumulation policy that starts by
specifying a target asset ratio, a* (more on how that might be chosen, in a later section), then
calculates the corresponding steady-state contribution rate c*, using (1*) above. We then posit a
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contribution policy that adjusts the contribution rate based on the gaps between the target and
actual asset ratio and contribution rate:
(2) ct+1 = ct + β(c* - ct) + γ(a* - at), where β є (0,1).
Together with (1″), we have a simple system of two linear difference equations that can be
usefully expressed in matrix form:
(𝑅/𝐺) (1/𝐺) 𝑎
(−𝑐 𝑝 /𝐺)
𝑎
[ ]
=[
][ ] + [
].
𝑐 𝑡+1
(1 − 𝛽) 𝑐 𝑡
(𝛾𝑎∗ + 𝛽𝑐 ∗ )
−𝛾
Denote the transition matrix above by A. Then the asymptotic stability condition is6
|tr (A)| < 1 + det(A) < 2, which, in the present case, implies
(i)

γ > β(R − G) ≡ γmin > 0, and

(ii)

γ < G - R(1 – β) ≡ γmax.

Condition (i) shows formally what was alluded to above: a piece of the adjustment mechanism
must be based on the asset gap, not just that of the contribution rate. The logic is straightforward. Suppose the contribution rate is already at its target c*, but the asset level is below the
target a*. Then contributions will have to rise in the short run to accumulate more assets, before
eventually dropping back down toward c*. Condition (ii) implies that the adjustment
mechanism must include the contribution gap, too. Formally, since we must have γmax > γmin, this
requires β > (R − G)/G > 0. The logic here is also straight-forward. If assets are at their target
ratio, but the contribution rate is below c*, then it needs to rise.
As our discussion above suggests, the convergence to steady-state may not be monotonic.
Indeed, it may not only reverse direction once (asymptotically monotonic), it may be oscillatory.
The condition for asymptotic oscillation is [tr (A)]2 < 4‧ det(A), or, in the present case:

6

See, for example, Neusser (2021), equation (3.18), p. 84.
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(iii)

γ > G[(R/G) – (1 − β)]2/4 ≡ γm/o,

where the subscript m/o denotes the border between monotonic and oscillatory. It can be shown
that for γmax > γmin (i.e., β > (R − G)/G), γm/0 lies in between. Thus, the asymptotic behavior of
the system varies with the range of γ as follows:
Table 2: Convergence Conditions
Range of γ

Asymptotic Behavior of (1″)-(2)

γ < γmin (given by (i))

Monotonic divergence

γmin < γ < γm/o (given by (iii))

Monotonic convergence

γm/o < γ < γmax (given by (ii))

Oscillatory convergence

γmax < γ

Oscillatory divergence

Figure 3 illustrates the combinations of β and γ that correspond to these asymptotic
behaviors. In general, it seems reasonable to presume that policy-makers would prefer
monotonic convergence to oscillatory convergence. Thus, the combinations of β and γ to be
considered would lie between γmin and γm/o, depicted by the black and blue curves in Figure 3.

Contribution Paths Toward Steady State Asset Accumulation: Simulation
Armed with these analytics, we illustrate some dynamic paths for contributions and assets
under policies that might plausibly be suggested. We begin with the representative plan
assumptions given above, R = 1.07, G = 1.03, cp = 0.38, c0 = 0.27 and a0 = 5. If, as discussed in
the previous section, our goal is simply to maintain the current asset level, then a* = 5 and c* =
0.18. In this case, policy-makers might be expected to choose a path that reduces contributions
as quickly as possible, without overshooting. This means choosing the adjustment parameters β

9

and γ arbitrarily close to one and γmin respectively, at the right boundary of the black γmin curve in
Figure 3. Under these parameters (β = 1.0, γ = γmin = 0.04), simulation confirms the contribution
rate drops immediately to just below c*, while the asset ratio shades slightly above a0 = a*.
Suppose we consider a more ambitious target ratio of a* = 7. This increase of 40 percent
above a0 would accumulate approximately the assets needed to match liabilities (discussed in the
next section), i.e., full actuarial funding (discounted at the expected return). At a* = 7, (1*)
gives us c* = 0.38 – (0.07 – 0.03) × 7 = 0.10 < c0 = 0.27, thus allowing eventually for a
dramatically lower contribution rate. Here, the choice of adjustment parameters β and γ must
navigate an intertemporal policy tradeoff. Contributions need to rise in the short run to
accumulate the assets required for the long-term reduction to c*. Thus, the tradeoff is between
speed of reaching c* vs. tempering the short-term rise in c required to reach a*. Suppose we set
a target of approaching c* by year 30 (corresponding to a somewhat conventional time horizon
for actuarial amortization schedules) and set the contribution adjustment parameter β equal to 0.5
(half speed). Then we find that the tradeoffs are plausibly managed by choosing the asset
adjustment parameter γ near the maximum value for monotonic convergence, γm/o = 0.075.
Figure 4a depicts the corresponding paths for the contribution rate (red curve, on the right scale)
and asset ratio (blue curve, on the left scale). This path raises the contribution rate for about 7
years to a maximum of 36 percent (a 9 point hike), before ultimately dropping down to
approximately 10 percent by year 30. Setting β any faster requires a sharper short-term rise in
contributions and setting it any slower fails to so closely approach c* in 30 years.
Naturally, these results are sensitive to the assumed rate of return. As discussed above, if
r = 5% instead of 7%, the required contributions are rather different. Under the first scenario, to
simply maintain the current asset ratio of 5, the contribution rate must rise by a point, instead of
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falling by 9 points. Similarly, for the more ambitious scenario of raising a* by 40% (to reach
full funding), the picture is more daunting if r = 5%. As Figure 4b shows, the contribution rate
would need to rise in the short run by 20 percentage points (to nearly 50 percent of payroll), for
an ultimate reduction of only about 3 points, a much more challenging picture than Figure 4a.
There are several take-aways from these exercises. First, our dynamic analysis shows
how to generate smooth adjustment paths, unlike the actuarial scenario of the contribution cliff
that is supposedly reached upon completion of the amortization schedule. Second, as is wellknown, but illustrated here in a formal dynamic context, deterministic scenarios have their
limitations, given the risk of investment returns. Finally, even within a deterministic context,
one needs some criterion to anchor the asset accumulation goal. That criterion has traditionally
been based on liabilities, to which we now turn.

Steady State Condition for Liabilities
We begin with the fundamental growth equation for liabilities:
(3) Lt+1 = Lt(1+d) + cntWt − cptWt ,
where Lt denotes accrued liabilities at the beginning of period t, d is the discount rate, and cnt is
the “normal cost rate,” the rate at which new liabilities accrue, as a percent of payroll. Liabilities
grow by the interest on past liabilities, plus newly accrued liabilities, net of benefit payments that
extinguish prior liabilities. Equation (3) is analogous to the asset growth equation (1), but with
some key differences:
First, the formulation in (3) allows for a distinction between the discount rate d and the
rate of return on assets r. Standard actuarial practice, of course, has traditionally equated the
two. By contrast (as is well known and much-discussed), finance economics has consistently
made the case that guaranteed benefits should be discounted by interest rates of correspondingly
11

low-risk bonds, at least for accounting purposes. If asset accumulation, and projections thereof,
continue to reflect actual and assumed returns on a higher-risk pension fund portfolio, this raises
the question of how a dual rate system should play out in contribution policy. In the previous
section, where our analysis was confined to asset accumulation, the contribution policy, both in
steady-state and in adjustment to steady-state, depended only on r and not on d. We consider
below how the consideration of liabilities, discounted at d < r, should or should not factor into
contribution policy.
The second difference between the liability growth equation (3) and the asset
accumulation equation (1) is the role of cnt, the normal cost rate, vs. ct,, the contribution rate. The
normal cost rate is determined independently of the contribution policy. It is completely driven
by the benefit formula, the cohort’s assumed separation probabilities over its members’ careers,
and the discount rate.7 The normal cost rate may be used to help determine the contribution
policy (as in standard actuarially determined contributions), but if the benefit formula is taken as
exogenous to our analysis, equation (3) is stand-alone. It is recursively prior to the asset
accumulation and contribution equations. We will return to this point below.
To examine the dynamics of liability accrual, we express (3) in the state variable λ = L/W
= liabilities/payroll, using the same steps as in the derivation of (1′):
(3′) λt+1(1+gt) = λt(1+d) + cnt − cpt .
If we take the benefit formula and demographic/worklife assumptions as exogenous, then so are
cn and cp. Thus, we can readily derive the steady-state liability ratio:
(3*) λ* = (cp − cn)/(d − g).

7

It also depends on the specific actuarial cost method for allocating liabilities between past and future accruals. To
fix ideas, we have in mind the standard entry age normal cost method.
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This expression has a simple interpretation. First note that the present value of future payroll in
steady-state is Wt/(d – g), consistent with the standard formula for a growing perpetuity. Then
note that the present value of future benefit payments and future liability accruals (normal costs)
are, respectively, fractions cp and cn of the PV of future payroll. Thus, equation (3*)’s steadystate ratio between accrued liabilities and payroll represents the difference between the present
values of future benefit payments and future normal costs (scaled to current payroll).8 A
decrease in d raises the former more than the latter, since future benefit payments for any given
cohort (and thus for all cohorts taken together) have longer duration than future normal cost
payments. Thus, λ* rises.
It is worth clarifying here that (3*) must hold, as an accounting identity, if we are in
demographic steady-state, with a constant growth rate g (along with unchanging separation
probabilities and benefit formula). Any deviations of the liability ratio from the steady-state
value can only be due to past or future variation in payroll growth, in the plan’s run-up to (or
run-down from) the mature membership configuration of steady-state age distribution among
actives and retireds. In such non-steady-state periods, the payment rate, cpt, would deviate from
the steady-state value cp (lower in the run-up to plan maturity, due to lower ratio of
retireds/actives, and conversely in the run-down from maturity) and that would drive the
deviations of λt from λ* through the accounting identities of (3) and (3′). Thus, unlike the asset
accumulation dynamic, where deviations from steady-state arise from the contribution history,
and which pose a non-trivial question of stability, as examined above, there is no such issue here:

8

This follows from the basic identity that the present value of all future benefit payments equals the present value of
benefits yet to be accrued (the present value of future normal costs) plus the present value of benefits previously
accrued, but not yet paid out. The latter term is the accrued liability, so it equals the difference between the present
value of all future benefits and the present value of future normal costs.
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non-steady-state liability ratios resolve themselves simply by virtue of evolving benefit payment
rates in the transition to the steady-state demographic configuration.
Figure 5 depicts the aggregate liability ratio, drawing again on the Public Plan Database,
where the liabilities are reported based on each plan’s assumed return, r. That ratio (depicted by
the red curve) has gradually risen from about 4.6 in FY01 to about 7.2 in FY20. Several factors
have contributed to this trend, including reductions in the assumed return and a rise in the ratio of
retireds to actives, as plans have matured and gone beyond maturity.9,10 Liabilities are much
higher when discounted at a low-risk rate d, instead of r. Estimates vary, comparing the liability
estimates of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (depicted by the blue curve in Figure 5)11
with those of the PPD suggest that properly discounted liabilities are 60 percent higher.12

Linking Asset Accumulation and Contributions to Liabilities
The natural link between our steady-state analysis of asset accumulation and liabilities is
to tie the asset goal to liabilities. Of course, this is the actuarial goal of full funding. We here
consider the more general goal of a target funded ratio, f* (e.g., the putative “standard” of 80
percent funded).13 Setting the asset goal of a* = f*λ*, and, for the moment, following the
actuarial convention of d = r, we find, from (1*) and (3*):
(4) c* = cp − (r − g)f*λ* = cp − f*(cp − cn) = (1− f*)cp + f*cn.

9

Benefit changes of course, have also affected the trends, but in no simple fashion, as many plans raised benefits in
the early 2000’s and then cut benefits for new hires in the 2010’s.
10
Comparing the liability ratios with the calculated values of (cp − cn)/(r − g) for FY01, FY10, and FY20, we find
these values match for FY01 (4.6 vs. 4.5), but for FY10 and FY20, the liability ratios exceed the calculated values,
5.7 vs. 4.3 and 7.2 vs. 6.1, respectively. There are many potential explanations for these gaps, but they would be
consistent with plans that are beyond mature, rather than in steady state.
11
The denominator in the ratio depicted is the PPD payroll series.
12
Estimates from Lenny, Lutz, Schule, and Sheiner (2020), using reported liabilities and rediscounted liabilities
indicate that the latter is about 80 percent higher.
13
See Costrell, 2018, where equation (4) was previously derived.
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As the funded goal varies from zero to full funding, the steady-state contribution rate varies from
the pay-go rate to the normal cost rate, with a weighted average of the two for intermediate
funding targets.
Let us now consider the steady-state implications of a dual rate system: discount rate d
for liabilities and assumed return r on assets. We then have:
(4') c* = cp − (r − g)f*λ* = cp – [(r − g)/(d – g)]f*(cp − cn).
As before, if the funding goal f* is zero, the contribution target is pay-go, and as f* is set higher,
the contribution target falls.
However, our question here is the impact on c* of reducing d below r. We have already
seen from (1*) that the only avenue for a drop in d to affect c* is through its impact on the asset
target a*. Since we are considering asset goals of the form a* = f*λ*, this means that a drop in
d below r would raise the target contribution rate through a rise in the liability ratio λ* unless it is
offset by a reduction in the target funded ratio f*.
If, for example, we take as our funding goal to simply maintain the current asset ratio, a*
= a0, then the rise in λ* from revaluation at d would, in effect, be completely offset by an
implicit drop in the target funded ratio f*.14 In this polar case, setting d to a low-risk rate for the
valuation of liabilities is purely an accounting and reporting measure, unrelated to funding goals.
More generally, however, one might expect that recognizing liabilities as guaranteed and
that asset returns are not, might lead policymakers to consider how much risk they wish to bear
and how much they wish to defray with higher contributions. To help elucidate the issue, let us
consider further the steady-state contribution rate c*, given in (4'). Here, we must interpret r as
the expected return on assets (rather than a deterministic rate) that exceeds the risk-free rate d

14

This is implicit in the Lenney, Lutz, and Sheiner (2019a; 2019b) model. This explains why the contribution rate
in their model is effectively independent of d, despite their claim that setting d < r makes their model conservative.
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used for evaluating liabilities and their rate of accrual cn. The first implication of this is that a
full-funding policy f* = 1, or anywhere near it, implies that c* < cn: the contribution rate will not
cover normal costs (properly evaluated). Formally, (4') implies
(4'') c* − cn = (cp − cn)(1 – [(r − g)/(d – g)]f*) < 0, for f* >[(d − g)/(r – g)].
To fix magnitudes here, consider the values we have been using, r = 0.07 and g = 0.03, along
with d = 0.04 (a typical discount rate used in private pension accounting). The critical value of
f* in the expression above is then 25 percent. For any target funded ratio exceeding 25 percent,
steady-state contributions need not cover the normal costs (when rediscounted at d). Note how
strikingly this contrasts with standard actuarial funding schedules, under which contribution rates
drop to (but not below) cn, upon reaching full funding.
The point can be illuminated by re-writing (4') and simplifying to obtain:
(4''') c* = cp − (d − g)f*λ* − (r − d)f*λ* = (1− f*)cp + f*cn – (r − d)f*λ*.
Comparing with (4), we have a rediscounted normal cost rate (higher cn), but the third term may
be interpreted as the implicitly assumed arbitrage profits between the return on accumulated
assets and interest on covered liabilities. These assumed arbitrage profits help defray the higher
normal costs, in lieu of contributions that might otherwise be required. Alternatively, this term
may be interpreted as the risk premium, which would be borne by the plan as the implicit cost of
risk under the contribution policy implied by this approach.

Sketching Out an Approach to Integrating Dual Rates into Contribution Policy
The debate over actuarial discounting brings out a bit of schizophrenia over dual rates. It
is increasingly (if grudgingly) recognized that the finance economists are right about discounting
liabilities at a low-risk rate that corresponds to the guaranteed nature of promised benefits. And
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yet, the finance economists are typically careful to restrict their conclusion to reporting
requirements, and not necessarily to funding policy.
Our analysis above points to an approach that at least informally integrates dual rates into
a contribution policy: report liabilities λ accurately, using d, and then set a target funded ratio,
f*. As with standard actuarial policy, the asset accumulation goal is tied to liabilities, since that
represents the cost of the benefits to which asset accumulation is directed. As we have seen from
(4), when the goal is set in this fashion, the required contribution rate is governed by both cost
rates: the pay-go rate cp and the (properly discounted) normal cost rate cn.
The open question, then, is how to set the target funded ratio, f*. For example, if we
were to aim at reproducing current funding goals, represented by the target asset ratio of a* = 7
depicted in Figure 4a, but with rediscounted liabilities, then the target funded ratio would be
reduced from f* = 100% (of wrongly discounted liabilities) to about f* = 60% (of accurately
discounted liabilities).
Our proposal, however, is to go back to fundamentals. In general terms, for public plans
the target ratio should be based on the public’s preferences for intergenerational cost-sharing and
its tolerance for risk in pursuit of returns. We believe that our equation (4''') can be helpful in
systematizing an approach to this decision, in conjunction with a semi-formal social welfare
function. Let us posit the latter as –V[(a* - a0), E(c*), σ(c*)], where (a* - a0) is a short-hand
measure of the costs required over some period to reach the asset target; E(c*) is the expected
value of the steady-state contribution rate at which the asset target is aimed, given by (4'''); and
σ(c*) is the risk associated with that target. Since these three arguments to V are social “bads,”
we preface V with a minus sign and let the partials V1, V2, and V3 be positive.
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The optimization problem over these three “bads” requires a joint decision on two
instruments: (i) the investment allocation plan, formally represented by the target return r, and
the associated risk premium (r – d); and (ii) the target funded ratio, f*. We do not propose here
to spell out a full solution to this complex problem, but rather to sketch out the considerations
that might generate such a joint decision and to infer some contours of what that would look like.
Specifically, we consider the optimization of –V[(a* - a0), E(c*), σ(c*)], subject to (4'''), over the
choice variable f*, conditional on the investment decision represented by (r – d).
We first consider the polar case, where the plan has no tolerance for risk (V3 is effectively
infinite). In this case, the plan would invest entirely in fixed income, so r would be reduced to
d, and the third term in (4''') would vanish. (Semi-)formally, the plan would only raise f* so long
as the marginal social benefit of a higher target exceeds the marginal social cost. Here, the
benefit of raising f* is the reduction in the steady-state contribution c*, and the cost is the extra
effort required to reach the target asset ratio:
Raise f* as −V2 dE(c*)/df* > V1 da*/df*.
Using (4''') and a* = f*λ*, we have:
Raise f* as V2 (cp – cn) > V1 λ*.
The key point here is that if liabilities are properly discounted at d, instead of r, so would
their rate of accrual, the normal cost rate, cn. This would raise cn much closer to the pay-go rate
cp.15 Consequently, in this case of total risk-aversion, there may be relatively little benefit (V2 (cp
– cn)) to any marginal increase in the target asset ratio. The extent to which the target would be
raised rests heavily on the degree to which future generations are weighed against current
generations (V2 vs. V1). It seems unlikely that a totally risk-averse public plan would pursue full-

15

The normal cost rate would actually exceed the pay-go rate if d < g. We assume d > g, but maybe not by much.
Estimates in Lenney, Lutz, Schule, and Sheiner (2020) put rediscounted normal cost higher than the pay-go rate.
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funding (f* = 1), or anything approaching it, since that would require the accumulation of
sufficient assets to generate fixed income flows matched to anticipated benefit payments.
Undoubtedly, this would require massive hikes in contributions, imposing unacceptably high
transition costs on the current generation for relatively little benefit in the steady-state.
However, public plans do appear to have some tolerance for risk by investing in assets
with higher expected returns, r, but with greater risk. Our expression (4''') helps understand the
additional considerations in play for optimizing f*. Our expression for comparing marginal
benefit and marginal cost would now be:
Raise f* as V2 [(cp – cn) + (r − d)λ*] > V1 λ* + V3 ρ(r − d)λ*,
where we take ρ as the standard deviation of return per unit of risk premium. Thus, in
comparison with the polar case of total risk aversion, the additional marginal benefit is the extra
expected return from a higher target asset ratio and the additional marginal cost is the extra risk.
Clearly for any degree of risk-tolerance there is some range of f* over which the benefit from the
extra return exceeds the cost of risk. Thus, we would expect the optimal f* to exceed that under
total risk-aversion. Under what conditions (if any) we would expect the goal to be full-funding
(f* = 1) is not a question we can answer here. Our more modest intention is that the semi-formal
expressions we provide can guide future empirical work to help integrate the insights of finance
economics and steady-state analysis into pension funding policy.

Conclusion
Standard actuarial practice pursues intergenerational equity by employing funding rules
that seek to ensure each generation pays for the services they receive. These rules do this through
the concepts of normal cost and amortization, which together, in theory, should result in fully
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funded benefits for each cohort of workers and taxpayers. Normal cost is meant to pre-fund the
full cost of benefits earned by a cohort of employees over their careers, while amortization is
meant to close funding gaps that result from payment shortfalls and unrealized assumptions.
In practice, these rules have failed to adequately link earned benefits and contributions.
The true market cost of earned benefits have been understated, leading to the accumulation of
large pension debt and steeply rising contributions to amortize that debt. These payments are
crowding out spending in other areas like infrastructure and education. Given this result, it is
questionable whether current actuarial practice has effectively maintained intergenerational
equity, as current generations are paying for past benefits. In addition, standard amortization
practice often builds in a large drop in taxpayer contributions at the end of the amortization
period. The current generation of taxpayers is arguably being asked to bear a disproportionate
share of the atonement for past sins compared to future generations.
A primary cause of public pensions’ current financial problems was the failure to
adequately consider the risks involved and the implications of those risks and uncertainties for
future generations of public workers and taxpayers. In this paper, we strive to better elucidate
pension funding dynamics using basic parameters and steady-state analysis. We propose a new
pension funding approach that allows for proper liability discounting, clearer consideration of
risk, and smooth contribution adjustment. We believe our analysis may offer a more honest
approach, both in properly discounting liabilities, and not promising a mortgage-burning party
when contributions plummet. Finally, we sketch a social welfare framework that could be used
to balance intergenerational equity, the quest for returns, and investment risk based on the
sponsoring government’s assessment of public preferences.
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Our approach can be thought of as replacing both pieces of current actuarial practice:
normal cost and amortization. Normal cost is effectively replaced by the steady-state
contribution rate given in (4'''), which (i) allows for a blend between normal cost (properly
discounted) and pay-go, depending on the target funded ratio; and (ii) allows for excess returns (r
– d) in exchange for the risk borne by the sponsoring government.
The other part of our proposal effectively replaces amortization schedules, which are
currently based on the quantity of pension debt, a set amortization period, and an assumed
payroll growth rate to backload payments using the “percent of payroll” method. All of these
elements have flaws, as the debt is understated by aggressive discounting, the amortization
period sets a funding cliff, and the “percent of payroll” method often moves funding farther away
from the target, through initial periods of negative amortization.
Instead of an amortization schedule, our approach sets out equation (2), which specifies
the adjustment process to the steady-state contribution rate and target asset ratio. This ties to the
first argument of the social welfare function sketched out above, spelling out the contribution
trajectory required to reach any specified target asset ratio, such that the near-term burden can be
weighed against the long-term (steady-state) reduction in contributions.
Our future work will delve into how we might operationalize the ideas we lay out here
and the implications of real-world application. Specifically, we will explore the impact of
stochastic investment returns on funding and contributions and implications of plan maturity and
cash flow for our proposed funding approach. We hope that our pension funding analysis will
help us learn from the sins of the past rather than repeating them in the present, imposing likely
burdens on the future.
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Table 1: Pension Funding Notation
A = assets on hand
L = accrued liabilities, the present value of future benefits earned to date
f = funded ratio, A/L (full funding goal is f = 100%)
W = payroll
a = A/W = assets/payroll
λ = L/W = liabilities/payroll
c = contribution rate, % of payroll
cp = benefit payments as % of payroll (“pay-go rate”)
cn = newly accrued liabilities as % of payroll (“normal cost rate”)
r = return on assets; R = (1+r)
d = discount rate used to calculate present value of liabilities; D = (1+d)
g = growth rate of payroll; G = (1+g)
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Figure 1. Normal Cost, Contribution and Benefit Rates, FY01 − FY20
Public Plans Data: 119 state & 91 local plans
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Figure 2. Assets/Payroll, FY01 − FY20
Public Plans Data: 119 state & 91 local plans
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Figure 3: Asymptotic Behavior of Asset Accumulation and Contribution Rate
r = 7%, g = 3%
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Figure 4a. Simulation of Contribution Rate & Asset Ratio
R = 1.07, G = 1.03, a* = 7.0, c* = 0.10, β = 0.5, γ = γm/o = 0.075
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Figure 4b. Simulation of Contribution Rate & Asset Ratio
R = 1.05, G = 1.03, a* = 7.0, c* = 0.24, β = 0.5, γ = γm/o = 0.069
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Figure 5. Assets & Liabilities, True & Reported, FY01 − FY20
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